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ABSTRACT

Recent studies of electoral accountability show that in countries like India, Brazil
and some Eastern European countries incumbents face a disadvantage compared to their
challengers. These results are in contrast to evidence from the US and other western
democracies where incumbents enjoy a significant advantage. In order to examine this
difference in the effects of incumbency status we analyze the Indian parliamentary
elections between 1998 and 2014. We use Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design to
study how being an incumbent affects the contestants’ margin of victory and probability
of winning in a reelection. The results from the study show that incumbents faced a
consistent disadvantage over the five elections even though the level of disadvantage
varied over these elections.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TITLE PAGE .................................................................................................................... i
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... ii
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... ⅳ
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... ⅴ
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1

II.

LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................. 4

III.

INDIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM ................................................................... 7

IV.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY ................................................................. 10

V.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION .................................................................. 18
a. All Parties Analysis ............................................................................ 18
b. Party-wise Analysis ........................................................................... 26
c. Coalition-wise Analysis ..................................................................... 36

VI.

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 46

APPENDICES ............................................................................................................... 48
A:
B:
C:
D:

Category-wise Analysis ............................................................................... 49
Pandas Code for All Parties Analysis .......................................................... 52
Pandas Code for Party-wise Analysis .......................................................... 69
Pandas Code for Coalition-wise Analysis.................................................... 84

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 102

iii

LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page

1.

Snapshot of data obtained from the ECI website used in this analysis ........ 11

2.

The incumbency disadvantage for all parties............................................... 20

3.

The incumbency disadvantage for BJP and INC ......................................... 27

4.

The incumbency disadvantage for NDA and BJP ....................................... 37

iv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

Page

1. Adapted from Lee 2008, figure showing discontinuity at zero signifying
incumbency advantage ....................................................................................... 14
2. The probability of winning in 1999 as a function of the margin of victory
in 1998 ............................................................................................................... 21
3. The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory
in 1999 ............................................................................................................... 22
4. The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory
in 2004 ............................................................................................................... 23
5. The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory
in 2009 ............................................................................................................... 24
6. The probability of winning in 1999 as a function of the margin of victory
in 1998 (BJP) ..................................................................................................... 28
7. The probability of winning in 1999 as a function of the margin of victory
in 1998 (INC) ..................................................................................................... 29
8. The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory
in 1999 (BJP) ..................................................................................................... 30
9. The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory
in 1999 (INC) ..................................................................................................... 31
10. The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory
in 2004 (BJP) ..................................................................................................... 32
11. The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory
in 2004 (INC) ..................................................................................................... 33
12. The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory
in 2009 (BJP) ..................................................................................................... 34
13. The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory
in 2009 (INC) ..................................................................................................... 35
14. The probability of winning in 1999 as a function of the margin of victory
in 1998 (NDA) ................................................................................................... 38
15. The probability of winning in 1999 as a function of the margin of victory
in 1998 (UPA) .................................................................................................... 39
16. The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory
in 1999 (NDA) ................................................................................................... 40
17. The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory
in 1999 (UPA) .................................................................................................... 41
18. The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory
in 2004 (NDA) ................................................................................................... 42
19. The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory
in 2004 (UPA) .................................................................................................... 43

v

List of Figures (Continued)
Figure

Page

20. The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory
in 2009 (NDA) ................................................................................................... 44
21. The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory
in 2009 (UPA) .................................................................................................... 45
22. The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory
in 2004 considering candidate caste .................................................................. 50
23. The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory
in 2009 considering candidate caste .................................................................. 51

vi

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Research based on Western democracies shows that incumbent politicians (e.g.
Ansolabhere et al., 2000; Cox and Katz, 1996; Erilson, 1971; Gelman and King, 1990)
and political parties (Lee, 2008) demonstrate an advantage during elections at all levels of
government (e.g. Ansolabhere and Snyder, 2002; Hirano and Snyder, 2009). Although
most of this research is focused on U.S. elections, studies based on other Western
democracies also show that incumbents have an advantage over non-incumbents in
elections (e.g. Hainmueller and Lurz-Kern, 2008; Katz and King, 1999; Carey and
Shugart, 1995; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987).
Several theories have been developed to explain this incumbency advantage.
Incumbents have access to resources that their challengers do not. They can use these
resources to influence public policies that make them seem more favorable to their
constituents giving the incumbents a perceived valence advantage (Ashworth, 2005;
Besley, 2007). They can also use their tenure in office to influence the media to gain
more visibility, making them seem more ideologically aligned with their constituency
(Lee, 2016). Incumbents also have the opportunity to generate resources that they can use
for campaigning in forthcoming elections (Duraisamy et al., 2014). Incumbents,
therefore, have the ability to influence their constituents in positive ways that can give
them a considerable advantage over their challengers.
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It is interesting to note that research on incumbency effects is primarily based on
mature democracies, concentrating mainly on developed Western countries. More recent
research based on younger democracies has shown that incumbents in developing
countries do not enjoy an advantage, and in most cases might face a decided
disadvantage. For example, studies based on countries like India (Linden, 2004; Uppal,
2009), Brazil (Klansja and Titiunik, 2013) and across post-communist democracies in
eastern and Central Europe (Roberts, 2008) show that incumbents face a disadvantage
compared to their challengers. Contrasting evidence in the nature of incumbency effects
between developed Western countries and younger developing democracies makes it an
interesting problem for further exploration.
Recent studies show that in developing countries like India, incumbents are
viewed less favorably compared to their challengers. This negative perception of the
incumbent’s tenure in office could be due to several reasons. For example, lack of social
and political policies in favor of the constituents, lack of infrastructural developments and
lack of public utilities can create dissatisfaction among the voters. Corruption on the part
of office-motivated politician may also affect voter perception of incumbents adversely.
The purpose of this study is to conduct an empirical analysis of the effect of
incumbency on election outcomes in India and also track changes in incumbency effects
over time. We use election data from 543 constituencies over the last five national
elections to check whether incumbents face a disadvantage (if any) over their challengers.
Although research exists on previous elections in India (Linden, 2004; Uppal, 2009), the
more recent elections have not been part of these studies. The Indian political landscape
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has changed considerably in recent years due to increase in voter awareness and rise of
regional parties. While single-party majority was the norm prior to 1991, multi-party
coalition governments have become increasingly common since then. In order to study
the effect of these changes on voter perception of incumbents it may be instructive to
look at recent elections.
We analyze the effect of incumbency on the probability of winning by using a
Regression Discontinuity (RD) design (Lee, 2001; Miguel and Zaidi, 2003). By using
margin of victory for both winning and losing candidates and allowing incumbency status
to be discontinuous at zero, we can study the causal effect of incumbency for candidates
that have barely won the election as compared to those who have barely lost; as long as
all other characteristics that can influence probability of winning for all candidates vary,
on average, continuously at the zero margin (Lee, 2001). We study the effect of being an
incumbent on the performance in a given election by estimating the relationship of
probability of winning an election and the margin of victory in the previous election. We
analyze the incumbency effects for individual political parties over the elections in 1998,
1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. Aggregated incumbency effects for the two major political
parties, namely Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Indian National Congress (INC) are
presented. Since India follows a Westminster type of Parliamentary system, alliances
between parties are as important as the parties themselves, necessitating analysis of the
coalitions formed between the political parties. Incumbency effects are thus presented for
two major coalitions- the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the INC-led
United Progressive Alliance (UPA).
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Studies based on the United States Congress and other Western democracies show
that incumbents are more likely to win reelections than non-incumbents (Gelman and
King, 1990; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2000). Several theories have been
proposed to explain this advantage. Incumbents can use their time in office to signal their
efficiency to voters while non-incumbents do not have this opportunity. By strategic use
of available resources incumbents can gain significant electoral advantage over their
challengers (Ashworth, 2005; Mayhew, 1974). Designing public policy that aligns with
the interests of the constituency (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Rivers and Fiorina,
1989), and using the media to strategically influence voters, incumbents can use their
office to present themselves more favorably to the voters (Prior, 2006). Alternatively,
incumbent advantage can also stem from the fact that rational voters assume that time
spent in office makes incumbents more efficient and better able to serve the constituents
than their inexperienced challengers (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2008; Zaller,
1998). This incumbency advantage in resource-rich countries such as the United States is
not restricted to legislative offices but extends to incumbents in non-legislative offices as
well (Mahdavi, 2015; Lee 2016). Although these explanations for incumbency advantage
seem intuitive they do not explain why incumbents in Brazil, India, post-communist
Europe or Sub-Saharan Africa do not experience a similar advantage and in some cases
even experience a disadvantage.
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Recent empirical studies show evidence of incumbency disadvantage in
developing countries around the world. Lee (2008), Linden (2004) and Uppal (2009) use
a Regression Discontinuity technique to show that incumbents in national and state
parliamentary elections were 14 to 22 percent less likely to win in re-elections. Titiunik
(2009) and Klanja and Titiunik (2013) study mayoral elections in Brazil and find that an
incumbent political party is 20 percent less likely to win a re-election. The sharp contrast
in incumbency effects in developed and developing countries has made this an interesting
problem for further research.
In spite of growing evidence existing literature does not provide many
explanations for this incumbency disadvantage. Uppal (2009) studied state elections in
India and found that the incumbency disadvantage can be attributed to poor government
performance in provision of public goods. In constituencies that lacked essential utilities
such as electricity, and fewer schools and hospitals, voters viewed incumbents less
favorably and were more likely to punish them by voting against them in re-elections.
This theory shows that voting behavior is influenced by their negative perception of the
incumbent rather than the merit of their challengers (Eggers and Spirling, 2015; Lee,
2016). Other studies link incumbency disadvantage in developing countries to corruption
on the part of office-motivated politicians. Klasnja (Forthcoming) studies mayors in
Romania and shows that mayors with higher incentives to corruption faced a greater
disadvantage. In studies based on Indian elections studies showed that the incumbency
disadvantage stemmed from the participation of candidates with a criminal background in
state elections (Aidt, Golden and Tiwari (2011).
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Corruption seems like a plausible explanation for incumbency disadvantage as
rent extraction is considered wasteful by voters and, therefore, they are less likely to vote
for

rent-seeking

office-motivated

politicians.

In

related

research

incumbency

disadvantage has been shown to stem from specific institutional characteristics. For
example, mayors in Brazil face a disadvantage that stems from the lack of term limits and
weak political parties (Klasnja and Titiunik, 2014). Linden (2004) showed that in India
there was a marked change in incumbency effects in elections before and after the 1980s.
The study showed that incumbency disadvantage grew in elections after the 1980s due to
the decline of the one of the most prominent political parties. While these explanations
might help explain incumbency disadvantage in certain specific situations it is slightly
more complicated to generalize these theories. Institutional differences and varying
electoral processes make it difficult to isolate causal effects that may help explain the
difference in incumbency effects in developed and developing countries.
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CHAPTER THREE
INDIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

The legislative branch of the government of the Republic of India follows a
Westminster parliamentary system, which is a bicameral system consisting of two
houses: the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and the Rajya Sabha (Council of States).
The Lok Sabha consists of 545 members who serve a five-year term - 543 of these
members are elected directly from their respective constituencies and two are nominated
by the President from the Anglo-Indian community, if in his opinion the Anglo-Indians
community is not being adequately represented. The Rajya Sabha is a permanent house
and can have a maximum of 250 members, and unlike the Lok Sabha, is not subject to
dissolution. Most members of the Rajya Sabha are elected indirectly by state and union
territory legislatures and twelve are appointed by the President of India based on
contributions in various fields such as the arts, sports, science and social services.
Members serve a staggered six-year term with one-third of the members retiring every
two years. For the purpose of this study, we look at election data from Lok Sabha
elections that are conducted by the Election Commission of India over 543
constituencies. The parliamentary system in India follows a single-tier majoritarian
framework, i.e. each eligible voter in the country votes once and there is one set of
elected representatives. All elections are first past the post, where the candidate that gets
the highest number of votes wins the election.
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India has a multi-party political system. All political parties are required to be
registered with the Election Commission of India. The commission determines the status
of the party based on set criteria. Registered political parties that are either national or
state level parties enjoy certain advantages such as broadcast time on public television
and radio channels. As of September 2016, there are 1761 registered political parties in
India of which 7 are national-level and 48 are state-level parties. In addition to
conducting the elections, the Commission also compiles detailed reports on all national
and state elections. The reports include information on each constituency where elections
were held. The number of candidates that contested, name of their political parties,
number of votes cast, number of votes by each candidate and other statistics about the
electorate.
In our study, we focus on five Lok Sabha elections from 1998 to 2014. The Indian
political scenario has changed significantly over these last few decades. While election
outcomes were mostly predictable prior to 1989, they have become more competitive
since. The number of national and regional parties has grown in number. The number of
candidates contesting in the elections has also increased significantly. Due to the
competitive political climate and the involvement of state and regional parties in national
politics, the dominance of a single political party or coalition has become less likely. The
emergence of smaller regional political parties is a growing trend leading to candidates
frequently switching party affiliations. Apart from growing competition among parties,
the rise in communal tensions and caste and religion-based politics have added to the
volatile nature of the elections. These changes may have significant effects on voter
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perception of candidates and voter behavior leading to significantly different electoral
dynamics.
Many studies based on the United States and other Western democracies have
shown that incumbents have a higher chance of being reelected compared to nonincumbents. The incumbency advantage applied to Indian election as well, before 1989,
as shown in the study by Linden (2004). However, incumbency advantage has declined
after 1989 due to the factors listed previously. The trends in the few elections after 1989
studied by Linden suggest that incumbents may have faced a disadvantage in these
elections. In this study, we have investigated the progression of this trend regarding the
incumbency advantage/disadvantage for elections from 1998 to 2014. Specifically, we
have looked at the effects of incumbency on election outcome for every constituency of
the Lok Sabha for National Elections conducted in 1998, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The data has been obtained from the Election Commission of India (ECI). The
ECI is an autonomous authority set up under the provision of the Constitution of India.
The Commission is responsible for administering all state and national level elections and
elections to the offices of the President and Vice President of India. In addition to
overseeing the elections the ECI also publishes detailed reports on all the constituencies
where elections were conducted. For each constituency, the reports contain the number of
candidates contesting, their names and party affiliations, the number of votes won by
each candidate as well as voter demographics. In this study we use data for all 543
constituencies over five general Lok Sabha elections.
The dataset used in this study consists of detailed reports for each candidate
contesting an election for each of the 543 constituencies in India. A snapshot of the data
is shown in Table 1 below. Each row corresponds to one contesting candidate and lists
information regarding the candidate, the constituency, party affiliation, the number of
votes earned and the final position. There are typically between 5000 and 6000 rows of
data for each election year. The candidates contesting the same constituency are always
sorted with the winner at the top with the losing candidates following in descending
order. This handy fact is utilized to identify the winner in each block of rows representing
a constituency.
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Table 1: Snapshot of data obtained from the ECI website used for this analysis

State
ID
S22
S22
S22
S22
S22
S22
S22
S22
S22
S22
S22
S23
S23
S23
S23
S23

Const
State ID
TAMIL NADU
39
TAMIL NADU
39
TAMIL NADU
39
TAMIL NADU
39
TAMIL NADU
39
TAMIL NADU
39
TAMIL NADU
39
TAMIL NADU
39
TAMIL NADU
39
TAMIL NADU
39
TAMIL NADU
39
TRIPURA
1
TRIPURA
1
TRIPURA
1
TRIPURA
1
TRIPURA
1

Const.
name
M YYYY
Nagercoil 3 2004
Nagercoil 3 2004
Nagercoil 3 2004
Nagercoil 3 2004
Nagercoil 3 2004
Nagercoil 3 2004
Nagercoil 3 2004
Nagercoil 3 2004
Nagercoil 3 2004
Nagercoil 3 2004
Nagercoil 3 2004
Tripura West
3 2004
Tripura West
3 2004
Tripura West
3 2004
Tripura West
3 2004
Tripura West
3 2004

11

G
e
Candid n
ate
d Cas
Name er te Party Votes
BELLARMIN.
M GEN
A. V.CPM 410091
RADHAKRISHNAN.
M GEN BJPP
245797
BALASUBRAMANIAN.
M GEN ABHMT 4612
GEORGEM
THOMAS.
GEN INDR
4519
JAMALUDHEEN.
M GEN IND
B
3336
SIVAKUMAR.
M SCB IND
1758
MURUGAN.
M GEN
V. N.IND
1618
MANIKANTA
M GEN
PRASAD.
SHS M 717
PRABHAKARAN.
M SC K
IND
401
SUBASH.M
P SC IND
355
THANKAMONY.
M GEN CIND
351
KHAGENM
DAS
GEN CPM 496843
NIRMALAMDASGUPTA
GEN INC
112207
AMAL MALLIK
M GEN AITC
67379
RAMU BANIK
M GEN IND
10787
BRAJALAL
MDEBNATH
GEN IND
7023

Po
sit
io
n
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1
2
3
4
5

Although the data obtained from ECI is detailed there are some inconsistencies
that make the study of incumbency effects complicated and as such have been noted in
previous works on this topic. The most significant inconsistency is found in the
candidates’ names over election periods. The format in which the candidate names were
recorded has changed often over the years and this makes it difficult to follow the
election performance of each candidate over the years. To avoid the complications from
these inconsistencies we focus our analysis on the political party as our variable of
interest instead of the individual candidate.
Lok Sabha elections for the years 1998, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 were
examined in this analysis at the level of the constituency. The analysis was conducted
party-wise instead of candidate-wise. This choice can be defended by the ansatz that the
party name carries more weight in Indian elections than the candidate alone. This choice
has the added benefit of avoiding any confounding factors due to inconsistencies in the
reported name of the candidate.
Other inconsistencies noted in the dataset involve evolving columns across the
years studied. Specifically, the name of the column denoting states has been changed
from ‘state_name’ to ‘ST_NAME’ from the year 2004. The name of the column denoting
the constituency was changed from ‘PC Name’ to ‘PC_NAME’ in the year 2004. The
code abstracted these changing names to a name that was held constant across all years to
facilitate easy analysis in ‘pandas’. A column denoting the caste of the candidate was
added in 2004, while columns denoting the type of constituency and the age of the
candidate were added in 2009. The insertion of these columns caused the index of the
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columns to the right of the inserted columns to increase by 1, and due care was taken to
use the appropriate index per the year in consideration. Another subtle inconsistency in
the data was the presence of variable number of trailing spaces in the names of the
constituencies and the name of the states reported for each candidate. The state and
constituency name together form a unique identifier used to index each seat available for
election in the Lok Sabha, and care needs to be taken to remove the trailing spaces to be
able to match up the correct state and constituency.
The data was analyzed in ‘pandas’ – a python framework for analyzing large
datasets. The code has been reproduced in the appendices. STATA was used for
polynomial regression and the subsequent Regression Discontinuity (RD) analysis,
following the approach of (Lee 2008; Uppal 2009). The probability of winning of a
candidate in election ‘t+1’ is plotted as a function of the margin of victory in election ‘t’.
For elections where the margin of victory in election ‘t’ was huge (say > 40%), then it is
conceivable and intuitively understandable that the incumbent would have, in normal
circumstances, a high probability of getting re-elected. On the other hand, if a candidate
lost by a huge margin in election ‘t’, then that candidate would have a low probability of
winning in election ‘t+1’. One can then expect the probability of winning in election
‘t+1’ to be a continuous function of the margin of victory in election ‘t’. However, in Fig.
1 adapted from Lee (2008), that shows a similar analysis for the Democratic Party in the
USA, there is an appreciable discontinuity in the probability of winning where the margin
of victory is zero.
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Figure 1: Adapted from Lee 2008, figure showing discontinuity at zero signifying
incumbency advantage
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A negative margin of victory signifies that the candidate did not win in election
‘t’, while a positive margin of victory signifies that the candidate won in both election ‘t’
and in election ‘t+1’. Thus, considering the probability of winning when the margin of
victory in election ‘t’ is close to but on either side of zero, one can see that winners in
election ‘t’ that have barely won enjoy a significant advantage for re-election in election
‘t+1’ as compared to losers in election ‘t’ that have barely lost. If we consider close
elections, where all other factors are considered equal, then the advantage noted above is
attributed to the fact that the candidate in office has favorable conditions for a successful
campaign for re-election over his non-incumbent counterpart and is typically referred to
as ‘incumbency advantage’, which is typically observed in Western democracies and has
been well documented, as shown in Chapter 2.
For this analysis, the data was analyzed party-wise in three different ways
1. All Party analysis
2. Party-wise analysis
3. Coalition-wise analysis
All Party Analysis
The analysis is conducted using all parties contesting the particular
elections. For every constituency, the margin of victory is calculated for each
party that contested in that constituency. The margin of victory for all parties that
did not win the constituency is the difference in the votes received by them as
compared to the winning party normalized by the total votes cast in that
constituency. The margin of victory for the winning party is calculated as the
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difference in the votes received by the winner and the second-place party
normalized by the total votes cast in that constituency. The margin of victory is
then binned into 1% intervals and the probability of winning in election ‘t+1’ is
calculated as the proportion of winners in election ‘t+1’ to the total contestants
that lie in the same bin.
Party-wise Analysis:
This analysis was carried out for the two major political parties present in
India – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Indian National Congress (INC).
Only those constituencies where these two parties contested are considered for
this analysis, rest were ignored. The margin of victory was calculated as follows –
if the party in question (BJP or INC) was the winner in election ‘t+1’ and in
election ‘t’ as well, then the margin of victory is calculated as the difference of
votes received by the winning party and the second-place party normalized by the
total votes cast for all candidates in that constituency. If the party in question had
not won in election ‘t’, the margin of victory is calculated as the difference in the
votes received by the party as compared to the winning party normalized by the
total votes cast for all candidates in that constituency. Thus, the margin of victory
is positive for all incumbent winners and negative for all non-incumbent winners.
The margin of victory was then binned into intervals of 1%. The probability of
winning was calculated as the proportion of winners belonging to the party in
each bin compared to the total elections contested by the party where the margin
of victory fell in the same bin.
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Coalition-wise Analysis
The Indian political system is comprised of two major political parties and
numerous smaller regional parties. However, no single political party has received the
majority mandate in these election years (except 2014) to form a majority government,
and thus coalitions become the driving force in the formation of a stable government.
There are two major coalitions every year - the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
headed by the BJP, and the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) headed by the INC.
Depending on the political climate at the end of each election, many regional parties are
known to switch alliances. Thus, the party composition of each coalition changes from
one election cycle to the next. The year-wise party alliances were hardcoded into the code
(see appendices). For every party contesting a given constituency, the alliance was
determined depending on the party and the year. Once the alliance had been determined,
the rest of the analysis was similar to the analysis described in the party-wise section.

Data Fitting
The data was fitted on either side of the abscissa – the axis signifying margin of
victory. As only close elections are to be considered, the fit was not smoothed over the
entire range, rather only over 5 points in the local region. This was accomplished by the
‘-n’ option in the stata lpoly command. As a result, the fits appear jagged as it is not
smoothed across the entire range; however, only the contributions from close elections
are considered when establishing the magnitude of the discontinuity at zero.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Results are presented for the three different analyses described in the previous
section. In all these plots, the ordinate is the probability of winning in election ‘t+1’ while
the abscissa is the margin of victory in election ‘t’. Calculation of the two parameters has
been described in the previous section.

All Parties Analysis
1. 1998-1999:
Figure 2 shows the scatter plot for the election year ‘t=1998 and ‘t+1’=1999. The
election was conducted within one year of the previous election due to a coalition
government losing a no-confidence motion in the Parliament following the
withdrawal of a party from the coalition. As can be immediately seen in the figure,
the discontinuity seen in Fig. 1 has disappeared. This signifies that the advantage
enjoyed by incumbents in the Western democracies like the USA is not enjoyed by
the incumbents in India. The data was restricted to within 20% margin of victory on
the x-axis and a fourth degree polynomial was used for the polynomial regression
following the approach of Lee (2008). The level of incumbency disadvantage is
approximately 9 percentage points.
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2. 1999-2004:
Figure 3 shows the analysis for all parties for the years 1999 – 2004. For this election,
an incumbency disadvantage of approximately 30 percentage points can be observed
in this data, which is consistent with all-candidates data analyzed previously (See
Figure 1 in Duraisamy, Lemennicier and Khouri, 2014).
3. 2004 – 2009:
Figure 4 shows the probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of
victory in 2004. The discontinuity at zero has gone down to approximately 9.6
percentage points as compared to almost 30 in the last election year. This decrease in
the incumbency disadvantage is consistent with the results reported in the literature.
(See Figure 2 in Duraisamy, Lemennicier and Khouri, 2014)
4. 2009 – 2014:
This election year has been the most recent one in India and has not been included in
the studies referenced here. Figure 5 shows the probability of winning in 2014 plotted
as a function of the margin of victory in 2009. The incumbent still faced a
disadvantage as compared to the incumbent in the 2009-2014 elections. The
incumbency disadvantage went up to 10 percentage points in the last elections.
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The following table summarizes the incumbency disadvantage across all years.
Table 2: Incumbency Disadvantage from 1998 to 2014
Year
All Parties
1998-1999
9.1
1999-2004
29.8
2004-2009
9.6
2009-2014
10.1
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Figure 2:The probability of winning in 1999 as a function of the margin of victory in
1998
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Figure 3:The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory in
1999
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Figure 4:The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory in
2004
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Figure 5:The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory in
2009
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Party-wise Analysis
Analysis for the BJP and the INC party are presented year-wise. If the Indian political
system was truly a two party system, then the plots for BJP would be the complement of
the plots for INC, as it would be in a zero sum game. However, the numerous regional
parties in India split the vote and the two party approximations are not always valid, thus
we present results for both parties separately for each year.
1. 1998 – 1999:
Figures 6 and 7 show the probability of winning in 1999 plotted against the margin of
victory in 1998 for BJP and INC respectively.
2. 1999 – 2004:
Figures 8 and 9 show the probability of winning in 2004 plotted against the margin of
victory in 1999 for BJP and INC respectively.
3. 2004 – 2009:
Figures 10 and 11 show the probability of winning in 2009 plotted against the margin
of victory in 2004 for BJP and INC respectively.
4. 2009 – 2014:
Figures 12 and 13 show the probability of winning in 2009 plotted against the margin
of victory in 2004 for BJP and INC respectively.
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Table 3 summarizes the results from the RD for both parties year-wise. A positive
number signifies incumbency disadvantage in percentage points, while a negative
number signifies incumbency advantage in percentage points. As can be seen in the
table, the incumbency disadvantage is not constant but varies year to year and across
both parties. There is one instance of incumbency advantage for BJP in 2004 – 2009;
however, an incumbency disadvantage is faced by both parties in every year to a
varying degree.

Table 3: The incumbency disadvantage for BJP and INC
Year
BJP
1998-1999
1999-2004
2004-2009
2009-2014
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INC
0.26
0.07
-0.38
0.06

0.08
0.26
0.42
-0.03

Figure 6: The probability of winning in 1998 as a function of the margin of victory in
1999 (BJP)
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Figure 7: The probability of winning in 1998 as a function of the margin of victory in
1999 (INC)
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Figure 8: The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory in
1999 (BJP)
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Figure 9: The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory in
1999 (INC)
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Figure 10 The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory in
2004 (BJP)

32

Figure 11: The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory in
2004 (INC)
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Figure 12: The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory in
2009 (BJP)
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Figure 13: The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory in
2009 (INC)
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Coalition-wise Analysis
Analysis for the NDA and the UPA alliances are presented year-wise. The BJP-led
NDA and the INC-led UPA are the two major alliances that dominate the Lok Sabha
elections. We present results for both alliances separately for each year.
1. 1998 – 1999:
Figures 14 and 15 show the probability of winning in 1999 plotted against the margin
of victory in 1998 for NDA and UPA respectively.
2. 1999 – 2004:
Figures 16 and 17 show the probability of winning in 2004 plotted against the margin
of victory in 1999 for NDA and UPA respectively.
3. 2004 – 2009:
Figures 18 and 19 show the probability of winning in 2009 plotted against the margin
of victory in 2004 for NDA and UPA respectively.
4. 2009 – 2014:
Figures 20 and 21 show the probability of winning in 2009 plotted against the margin
of victory in 2004 for NDA and UPA respectively.
Table 4 summarizes the results from the RD for both alliances year-wise. A positive
number signifies incumbency disadvantage in percentage points, while a negative
number signifies incumbency advantage in percentage points. As can be seen in the
table, the incumbency disadvantage is not constant but varies year to year and across
both alliances.
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Table 4: The incumbency disadvantage for NDA and UPA
Year
NDA
UPA
1998-1999
0.06
0
1999-2004
0.23
0.09
2004-2009
-0.08
0.4
2009-2014
0
0
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Figure 14: The probability of winning in 1998 as a function of the margin of victory in
1999 (NDA)
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Figure 15: The probability of winning in 1998 as a function of the margin of victory in
1999 (UPA)
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Figure 16: The probability of winning in 1999 as a function of the margin of victory in
2004 (NDA)
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Figure 17: The probability of winning in 1998 as a function of the margin of victory in
1999 (NDA)
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Figure 18: The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory in
2009 (NDA)
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Figure 19: The probability of winning in 2004 as a function of the margin of victory in
2009 (UPA)
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Figure 20: The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory in
2014 (NDA)
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Figure 21: The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory in
2014 (UPA)
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

In this study we have analyzed the results of five Indian parliamentary elections to
determine the effect of incumbency status on the probability of winning and margin of
victory of contestants using the Regression Discontinuity design. The RD design enables
us to study close elections where candidates who barely won and those that barely lost
can be considered to differ only in their incumbency status, thereby allowing us to study
the effects of incumbency status.
The results show that there is consistently an incumbency disadvantage faced by
electoral candidates in India as observed in the last five elections. The level of
incumbency disadvantage varies widely year-to-year, from a few percentage points up to
almost 30 percentage points. Factors such as elections being held out of cycle or after a
hung parliament might affect the level of incumbency as seen in the 1998-1999 elections.
Similarly, other local and national events caused incumbency disadvantage to change
from 26 percent in 2004 to 10 percent in 2009. In the most recent elections in 2014 BJP
had a landslide win and the incumbency disadvantage reduced to 10 percent.
Conducting this analysis on the basis of political parties instead of individual
candidates helped us deal with the inconsistencies that arise due to mismatch of candidate
names. Additionally, we were able to avoid the conditional dependencies of the candidate
rerunning for elections in election ‘t+1’. While there are very few instances of parties not
contesting consecutive elections in a constituency, they are negligible as compared to the
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number of instances of candidates from a particular party being nominated to contest in
consecutive elections.
The primary conclusion of the study is that incumbents are disadvantaged in the
Indian Parliamentary elections and this disadvantage has persisted over the last few
decades. Due to the contrasting nature of the results to those from countries such as the
United States make this a significant study in understanding how voter behavior varies
across countries. It may also be valuable to study why these differences in incumbency
effects exist and how incumbent behavior affects voter perception of incumbents. These
are some of the areas that can be explored in further studies on the topic of incumbency
effects.
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APPENDICES
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Appendix A
Category-wise Analysis

We have shown in the preceding sections that a definite incumbency disadvantage
exists for political parties in India. To test whether this disadvantage is due to other
factors, it is necessary to analyze the data looking at other classifications. Here we have
analyzed the data considering the caste category of the candidate, to identify whether the
caste had any contribution to the incumbency disadvantage. The data for the caste of the
candidate is available since 2005, so we have analyzed the elections in 2005,2009 and
2014. Te analysis is similar to that carried out in Secion 5a, where the classification by
party is replaced by a classification by the caste of the candidate.
The impact of the caste of the candidate on the incumbency effects dictates
whether the shape of the graph in the case of the category-wise analysis would look
similar to the shape of the graph in the party-wise analysis. The graphs for 2004-2009 and
2009-2014 are presented below in Figs. A.1 and A.2. As can be seen in the figures, there
is no discontinuity observed in the graphs as for the party-wise analysis. This indicates
that the caste of the candidate is not a confounding factor for the party-wise analysis
carried out in the preceding sections. Similar tests for other variables should be carried
out in the future to eliminate any possible confounding factors from the analysis.

49

Figure 22: The probability of winning in 2009 as a function of the margin of victory in
2004 considering candidate caste
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Figure 23: The probability of winning in 2014 as a function of the margin of victory in
2009 considering candidate caste
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Appendix B
Pandas Code for ‘All Parties’

# -*- coding: utf-8 -*"""
Created on Sun Jun 26 19:06:52 2016

@author: labuseruni
"""
import math
import pandas as pd
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
from operator import itemgetter,attrgetter

#df_2009=pd.read_csv('2009.csv')
bin_width=1.0
#set bin_width in percent margin of vote share
yearlist= [ '1998','1999','2004','2009','2014']
#yearlist= [ '2009','2014']
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partylist= ['all_parties']

for year_i in range(0,len(yearlist)-1):

#

year1='1998'

#

year2='1999'
year1=yearlist[year_i];
year2=yearlist[year_i+1];
df_t1=pd.read_csv(year1+'.csv')
df_t2=pd.read_csv(year2+'.csv')
for partyname in partylist:
#partyname='INC'
outputfile=partyname+'_'+year1+'_'+year2+'_v3.csv'
outputfile2=partyname+'_'+year1+'_'+year2+'_v3.txt'
#Replace space in column name with _
df_t1.columns = [c.replace(' ', '_') for c in df_t1.columns]
df_t2.columns = [c.replace(' ', '_') for c in df_t2.columns]

#Rename column names so they arent different across years
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#Hacks for this to work, should be more seamless using decided key-value pairs for
'interesting' columns
y2014={'statename':

'State

name','pcname':

'PC

Name','partyname_index':

'PC

Name','partyname_index':

11,'votes_index': 12,'position_index' : 13}
y2009={'statename':

'State

name','pcname':

11,'votes_index': 12,'position_index' : 13}
y2004={'statename':

'ST_NAME','pcname':

'PC_NAME','partyname_index':

10,'votes_index': 11,'position_index' : 12}
y1999={'statename':

'ST_NAME','pcname':

'PC_NAME','partyname_index':

9,'votes_index': 10,'position_index' : 11}
y1998={'statename':

'ST_NAME','pcname':

'PC_NAME','partyname_index':

9,'votes_index': 10,'position_index' : 11}

mydict={'2014':y2014,'2009':y2009,'2004':y2004,'1999':y1999,'1998':y1998}

dict1=mydict[year1]
dict2=mydict[year2]

#creates new column that is unique
#2009&2014 have col name 'State_name', previous years have 'ST_NAME'
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if(year1=='2009' or year1 == '2014'):
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.State_name.str.cat(df_t1.PC_name,sep='_')
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.replace(' ','_')
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.strip()
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.upper()
else:
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.ST_NAME.str.cat(df_t1.PC_NAME,sep='_')
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.replace(' ','_')
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.strip()
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.upper()
#PC_names have trailing spaces! - the 'strip' removes these so we can search
between different years!

if(year2=='2009' or year2 == '2014'):
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.State_name.str.cat(df_t2.PC_name,sep='_')
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.replace(' ','_')
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.strip()
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.upper()
else:
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.ST_NAME.str.cat(df_t2.PC_NAME,sep='_')
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.replace(' ','_')
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.strip()
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df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.upper()

unique_vals_t1=df_t1['Unique'].unique()
unique_vals_t2=df_t2['Unique'].unique()
unique_vals = list(set(unique_vals_t1).intersection(unique_vals_t2))
unique_vals.sort()
#unique_vals now has id per constituency common to both years

df_t1_indexed=df_t1.set_index('Unique')
df_t2_indexed=df_t2.set_index('Unique')
#alternatively, try indexing with two columns? for another day.

#for now, use arrays:
a_t1=df_t1.values
a_t2=df_t2.values

out_a_t1=[]
margins=[]
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#unique,margin,won_flag
margin_based_t1=[]

count=0
for v in unique_vals:
print(v)
df_t1_constituency_slice=pd.DataFrame(df_t1_indexed.loc[v])
df_t2_constituency_slice=pd.DataFrame(df_t2_indexed.loc[v])

a_t1_constituency_slice=df_t1_constituency_slice.values
a_t2_constituency_slice=df_t2_constituency_slice.values

#Start processing per slice i.e. per constituency
total_votes=0
margin=0.0

#index to locate where in the slice the particular party we are interested in lies
#assuming dataset is sorted within constituency
#if the party was a winner, this will be first pos i.e. value of indec will be 0; else
non-zero
partyname_position_in_slice=-1

57

"""
if(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \
or a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \
or a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']] not in partylist \
or a_t2_constituency_slice[1][dict2['partyname_index']] not in partylist ):

#print(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']],a_t1_constituency_slice[1][d
ict1['partyname_index']],a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']],a_t2_cons
tituency_slice[1][dict1['partyname_index']])
#wait=input()
continue;
"""

#binary variable # =1 if party won in t+1
# =0 if party did not win in t+1
won_flag=0;

#print(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']],a_t1_constituency_slice[1][d
ict1['partyname_index']],a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']],a_t2_cons
tituency_slice[1][dict2['partyname_index']])
count+=1
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"""
winning_partyname_in_t2=a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]

for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]):
total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]

if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==winning_partyname_in_t2):
partyname_position_in_slice=i;
#assumption here is that there are never multiple candidates from same party
contesting the same constituency

if partyname_position_in_slice==-1:
continue;
"""

for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]):
total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]

for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]):
if(i==0):
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margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']]
else:
margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]

margin = margin*100.0/total_votes

if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict
2['partyname_index']]):
won_flag=1;
else:
won_flag=0;

margin_based_t1.append([v+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']],margi
n,won_flag])

"""
if(partyname_position_in_slice==0):
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margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']]
won_flag=1;
else:

margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[partyname_position_in_slice][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]
won_flag=0;

margin = margin*100.0/total_votes
"""

"""
if(a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]==partyname):
won_flag=1
else:
won_flag=0
"""
"""
margin_based_t1.append([v,margin,won_flag])
"""
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#here we have generated margin_based_t1 table
#cols are unique(pc_id),margin in t1 for party, flag indicating whether party won or
not in t2
#sort by margin

margin_based_t1=sorted(margin_based_t1,key=itemgetter(1))
binned_margin_t1=[]

for i in range(len(margin_based_t1)):
bin_no=int(math.floor(abs((margin_based_t1[i][1]))/bin_width))
if(margin_based_t1[i][1]<0.0):
sign_flag=-1.0
else:
sign_flag=+1.0
bin_no=int(bin_no*bin_width)+bin_width/2.0
bin_no=bin_no*sign_flag
print(margin_based_t1[i][1],bin_no)
binned_margin_t1.append([bin_no,margin_based_t1[i][2]])

half_total_bins=int(math.ceil(100/bin_width))#one-sided total
final_binned_margin=[]
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for i in range(half_total_bins):
bin_no_search1=-1.0*(i*bin_width+bin_width/2.0)
bin_no_search2=+1.0*(i*bin_width+bin_width/2.0)

count_won1=0
count_all1=0
count_won2=0
count_all2=0

for j in range(len(binned_margin_t1)):

if(binned_margin_t1[j][0]==bin_no_search1):
count_all1=count_all1+1;
if(binned_margin_t1[j][1]==1):
count_won1=count_won1+1;

if(binned_margin_t1[j][0]==bin_no_search2):
count_all2=count_all2+1;
if(binned_margin_t1[j][1]==1):
count_won2=count_won2+1;
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if(count_all1!=0):

final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search1,count_won1/count_all1,count_all1,count_
won1])
else:
final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search1,0,count_all1,count_won1])

if(count_all2!=0):

final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search2,count_won2/count_all2,count_all2,count_
won2])
else:
final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search2,0,count_all2,count_won2])

final_binned_margin=sorted(final_binned_margin,key=itemgetter(0))
final_df=pd.DataFrame(final_binned_margin)
final_df.to_csv(outputfile,index=False)
outf=open(outputfile2,'w')
for i in range(len(final_binned_margin)):
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line=str(final_binned_margin[i][0])+"\t"+str(final_binned_margin[i][1])+"\t"+str(final_bi
nned_margin[i][2])+"\t"+str(final_binned_margin[i][3])+"\n"
outf.write(line)

outf.close()

print(year1,year2,partyname,count)
wait=input()

"""
if(a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]==partyname):
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#calculate and append BJP margin to year 't'
#assuming dataset is sorted within constituency
if(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['position_index']]==1
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname):
bjp_margin_t1=(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']])
else:
for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]):
if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname):
bjp_margin_t1=a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]

total_votes=0
for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]):
total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]

bjp_margin_t1=bjp_margin_t1*100.0/total_votes

print(bjp_margin_t1)
out_a_t1.append([v,bjp_margin_t1])
margins.append(bjp_margin_t1)

66

and

binwidth=1.0
numbins=200/binwidth + 1.0
bins=np.linspace(-100,100,numbins)
hist,bin_edges = np.histogram(margins,bins)

x=bin_edges[0:numbins-1]
x=x+0.5
y=hist

out_df_t1=pd.DataFrame({'Count':y,'Margin':x})
out_df_t1=out_df_t1[['Margin','Count']]
out_df_t1.to_csv(outputfile,index=False)
plt.scatter(x,y)
plt.grid()
plt.plot(x,y)
plt.show()
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"""

#for v in unique_vals
#

print(df_2009[])

#for i in range(len(a2009)):
#
#

for j in range(len(a2009[i])):
print(a2009[i][j])

#for row in df_2009[:25].itertuples():
#print(row)

#for i in range(1):
#
#

for j in range(14):
print(a2009[i][j])
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Appendix C
Pandas Code for ‘BJP/INC’

# -*- coding: utf-8 -*"""
Created on Sun Jun 26 19:06:52 2016

@author: labuseruni
"""
import math
import pandas as pd
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
from operator import itemgetter,attrgetter

#df_2009=pd.read_csv('2009.csv')
bin_width=1
#set bin_width in percent margin of vote share
yearlist= [ '1998','1999','2004','2009','2014']
partylist= ['INC','BJP']
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for year_i in range(0,len(yearlist)-1):

#

year1='1998'

#

year2='1999'
year1=yearlist[year_i];
year2=yearlist[year_i+1];
df_t1=pd.read_csv(year1+'.csv')
df_t2=pd.read_csv(year2+'.csv')
for partyname in partylist:
#partyname='INC'
outputfile=partyname+'_'+year1+'_'+year2+'_v3.csv'
outputfile2=partyname+'_'+year1+'_'+year2+'_v3.txt'
#Replace space in column name with _
df_t1.columns = [c.replace(' ', '_') for c in df_t1.columns]
df_t2.columns = [c.replace(' ', '_') for c in df_t2.columns]

#Rename column names so they arent different across years
#Hacks for this to work, should be more seamless using decided key-value pairs for
'interesting' columns
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y2014={'statename':

'State

name','pcname':

'PC

Name','partyname_index':

'PC

Name','partyname_index':

11,'votes_index': 12,'position_index' : 13}
y2009={'statename':

'State

name','pcname':

11,'votes_index': 12,'position_index' : 13}
y2004={'statename':

'ST_NAME','pcname':

'PC_NAME','partyname_index':

10,'votes_index': 11,'position_index' : 12}
y1999={'statename':

'ST_NAME','pcname':

'PC_NAME','partyname_index':

9,'votes_index': 10,'position_index' : 11}
y1998={'statename':

'ST_NAME','pcname':

'PC_NAME','partyname_index':

9,'votes_index': 10,'position_index' : 11}

mydict={'2014':y2014,'2009':y2009,'2004':y2004,'1999':y1999,'1998':y1998}

dict1=mydict[year1]
dict2=mydict[year2]

#creates new column that is unique
#2009&2014 have col name 'State_name', previous years have 'ST_NAME'
if(year1=='2009' or year1 == '2014'):
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.State_name.str.cat(df_t1.PC_name,sep='_')
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df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.replace(' ','_')
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.strip()
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.upper()
else:
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.ST_NAME.str.cat(df_t1.PC_NAME,sep='_')
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.replace(' ','_')
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.strip()
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.upper()
#PC_names have trailing spaces! - the 'strip' removes these so we can search
between different years!

if(year2=='2009' or year2 == '2014'):
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.State_name.str.cat(df_t2.PC_name,sep='_')
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.replace(' ','_')
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.strip()
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.upper()
else:
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.ST_NAME.str.cat(df_t2.PC_NAME,sep='_')
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.replace(' ','_')
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.strip()
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.upper()
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unique_vals_t1=df_t1['Unique'].unique()
unique_vals_t2=df_t2['Unique'].unique()
unique_vals = list(set(unique_vals_t1).intersection(unique_vals_t2))
unique_vals.sort()
#unique_vals now has id per constituency common to both years

df_t1_indexed=df_t1.set_index('Unique')
df_t2_indexed=df_t2.set_index('Unique')
#alternatively, try indexing with two columns? for another day.

#for now, use arrays:
a_t1=df_t1.values
a_t2=df_t2.values

out_a_t1=[]
margins=[]

#unique,margin,won_flag
margin_based_t1=[]
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count=0
for v in unique_vals:
print(v)
df_t1_constituency_slice=pd.DataFrame(df_t1_indexed.loc[v])
df_t2_constituency_slice=pd.DataFrame(df_t2_indexed.loc[v])

a_t1_constituency_slice=df_t1_constituency_slice.values
a_t2_constituency_slice=df_t2_constituency_slice.values

#Start processing per slice i.e. per constituency
total_votes=0
margin=0.0

#index to locate where in the slice the particular party we are interested in lies
#assuming dataset is sorted within constituency
#if the party was a winner, this will be first pos i.e. value of indec will be 0; else
non-zero
partyname_position_in_slice=-1

"""
if(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \
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or a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \
or a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']] not in partylist \
or a_t2_constituency_slice[1][dict2['partyname_index']] not in partylist ):

#print(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']],a_t1_constituency_slice[1][d
ict1['partyname_index']],a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']],a_t2_cons
tituency_slice[1][dict1['partyname_index']])
#wait=input()
continue;
"""

#binary variable # =1 if party won in t+1
# =0 if party did not win in t+1
won_flag=0;

print(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']],a_t1_constituency_slice[1][di
ct1['partyname_index']],a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']],a_t2_const
ituency_slice[1][dict2['partyname_index']])
count+=1
for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]):
total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]
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if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname):
partyname_position_in_slice=i;
#assumption here is that there are never multiple candidates from same party
contesting the same constituency

if partyname_position_in_slice==-1:
continue;

if(partyname_position_in_slice==0):
margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']]
else:

margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[partyname_position_in_slice][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]

margin = margin*100.0/total_votes

if(a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]==partyname):
won_flag=1
else:
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won_flag=0

margin_based_t1.append([v,margin,won_flag])

#here we have generated margin_based_t1 table
#cols are unique(pc_id),margin in t1 for party, flag indicating whether party won or
not in t2
#sort by margin

margin_based_t1=sorted(margin_based_t1,key=itemgetter(1))
binned_margin_t1=[]

for i in range(len(margin_based_t1)):
bin_no=int(math.floor(abs((margin_based_t1[i][1]))/bin_width))
if(margin_based_t1[i][1]<0.0):
sign_flag=-1.0
else:
sign_flag=+1.0
bin_no=int(bin_no*bin_width)+bin_width/2.0
bin_no=bin_no*sign_flag
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print(margin_based_t1[i][1],bin_no)
binned_margin_t1.append([bin_no,margin_based_t1[i][2]])

half_total_bins=int(math.ceil(100/bin_width))#one-sided total
final_binned_margin=[]
for i in range(half_total_bins):
bin_no_search1=-1.0*(i*bin_width+bin_width/2.0)
bin_no_search2=+1.0*(i*bin_width+bin_width/2.0)

count_won1=0
count_all1=0
count_won2=0
count_all2=0

for j in range(len(binned_margin_t1)):

if(binned_margin_t1[j][0]==bin_no_search1):
count_all1=count_all1+1;
if(binned_margin_t1[j][1]==1):
count_won1=count_won1+1;
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if(binned_margin_t1[j][0]==bin_no_search2):
count_all2=count_all2+1;
if(binned_margin_t1[j][1]==1):
count_won2=count_won2+1;
if(count_all1!=0):

final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search1,count_won1/count_all1,count_all1,count_
won1])
else:
final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search1,0,count_all1,count_won1])

if(count_all2!=0):

final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search2,count_won2/count_all2,count_all2,count_
won2])
else:
final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search2,0,count_all2,count_won2])

final_binned_margin=sorted(final_binned_margin,key=itemgetter(0))
final_df=pd.DataFrame(final_binned_margin)
final_df.to_csv(outputfile,index=False)
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outf=open(outputfile2,'w')
for i in range(len(final_binned_margin)):

line=str(final_binned_margin[i][0])+"\t"+str(final_binned_margin[i][1])+"\t"+str(final_bi
nned_margin[i][2])+"\t"+str(final_binned_margin[i][3])+"\n"
outf.write(line)

outf.close()

print(year1,year2,partyname,count)
wait=input()
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"""
if(a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]==partyname):
#calculate and append BJP margin to year 't'
#assuming dataset is sorted within constituency
if(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['position_index']]==1
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname):
bjp_margin_t1=(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']])
else:
for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]):
if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname):
bjp_margin_t1=a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]

total_votes=0
for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]):
total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]

bjp_margin_t1=bjp_margin_t1*100.0/total_votes

print(bjp_margin_t1)
out_a_t1.append([v,bjp_margin_t1])
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and

margins.append(bjp_margin_t1)

binwidth=1.0
numbins=200/binwidth + 1.0
bins=np.linspace(-100,100,numbins)
hist,bin_edges = np.histogram(margins,bins)

x=bin_edges[0:numbins-1]
x=x+0.5
y=hist

out_df_t1=pd.DataFrame({'Count':y,'Margin':x})
out_df_t1=out_df_t1[['Margin','Count']]
out_df_t1.to_csv(outputfile,index=False)
plt.scatter(x,y)
plt.grid()
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plt.plot(x,y)
plt.show()

"""

#for v in unique_vals
#

print(df_2009[])

#for i in range(len(a2009)):
#
#

for j in range(len(a2009[i])):
print(a2009[i][j])

#for row in df_2009[:25].itertuples():
#print(row)

#for i in range(1):
#
#

for j in range(14):
print(a2009[i][j])
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Appendix D
Pandas Code for ‘All NDA/UPA’
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*"""
Created on Sun Jun 26 19:06:52 2016

@author: labuseruni
"""
import math
import pandas as pd
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
from operator import itemgetter,attrgetter

#df_2009=pd.read_csv('2009.csv')
bin_width=1.0
#set bin_width in percent margin of vote share
yearlist= [ '1998','1999','2004','2009','2014']
#yearlist= [ '1999','2004']
#partylist= ['INC','BJP']
partylist= ['NDA','UPA']
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for year_i in range(0,len(yearlist)-1):

#

year1='1998'

#

year2='1999'
year1=yearlist[year_i];
year2=yearlist[year_i+1];
df_t1=pd.read_csv(year1+'.csv')
df_t2=pd.read_csv(year2+'.csv')
for partyname in partylist:
#partyname='INC'
outputfile=partyname+'_'+year1+'_'+year2+'_v5.csv'
outputfile2=partyname+'_'+year1+'_'+year2+'_v5.txt'
#Replace space in column name with _
df_t1.columns = [c.replace(' ', '_') for c in df_t1.columns]
df_t2.columns = [c.replace(' ', '_') for c in df_t2.columns]

#Rename column names so they arent different across years
#Hacks for this to work, should be more seamless using decided key-value pairs for
'interesting' columns
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y2014={'statename':

'State

name','pcname':

'PC

Name','partyname_index':

11,'votes_index': 12,'position_index' : 13,'NDA':['BJP','SHS','TDP','LJP','SAD','BLSP
','AD','SWP','PMK
','AINRC','NPF','NPEP','IND','RSPK(B)','DMDK','RPI(A)','MDMK','RSPS','HJC
BL'],'UPA':['INC','NCP','RJD','JMM','IUML','RSP','KEC(M)','CPI','BVA','BOPF','RLD','J
KN','MD','SJD']}
y2009={'statename':
11,'votes_index':

'State

name','pcname':

'PC

Name','partyname_index':

12,'position_index'

:

13,'NDA':['BJP','JD(U)','SHS','RLD','SAD','JMM','AGP','NPF','RWS','INLD','IND'],'UPA
':['INC','AITC','DMK','NCP','JKN','MUL','JMM','VCK','BOPF','KEC(M)','IND','RPI(A)','
RPI']}
y2004={'statename':
10,'votes_index':

'ST_NAME','pcname':

'PC_NAME','partyname_index':

11,'position_index'

:

12,'NDA':['BJP','SHS','BJD','SAD','JD(U)','TDP','AITC','IFDP','NPF','SDF','MNF','IND','
ADMK'],'UPA':['INC','RJD','DMK','NCP','PMK','TRS','LJNSP','JMM','MDMK','CPM','C
PI','MUL','JKPDP','RPI(A)','KEC(M)','JD(S)','IND','AC','RP','PDS','PRBP']}
y1999={'statename':
9,'votes_index':

'ST_NAME','pcname':

'PC_NAME','partyname_index':

10,'position_index'

:

11,'NDA':['BJP','TDP','JD(U)','SHS','DMK','BJD','AITC','PMK','INLD','MDMK','SAD','
ABLTC','IND','MADMK','HVC','SDF','DBSM','TRC','BPSP','AC'],'UPA':['INC','ADMK'
,'RJD','RLD','MUL','BBM','KEC(M)','CPI','CPM','RPI','MCO','AITC']}
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y1998={'statename':

'ST_NAME','pcname':

9,'votes_index':

'PC_NAME','partyname_index':

10,'position_index'

:

11,'NDA':['BJP','ADMK','SAP','BJD','SAD','WBTC','SHS','PMK','LS','MDMK','JD','INC'
,'IND','HVP','NTRTDP(LP)'],'UPA':['INC','RJD','RPI','MUL','KEC(M)','BSP','CPI','MAD
MK','UCPI','SP']}

#to pick year
mydict={'2014':y2014,'2009':y2009,'2004':y2004,'1999':y1999,'1998':y1998}

#to pick alliance map for that year
#adict={'2014':a2014,'2009':a2009,'2004':a2004,'1999':a1999,'1998':a1998}

dict1=mydict[year1]
dict2=mydict[year2]

#creates new column that is unique
#2009&2014 have col name 'State_name', previous years have 'ST_NAME'
if(year1=='2009' or year1 == '2014'):
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.State_name.str.cat(df_t1.PC_name,sep='_')
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df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.replace(' ','_')
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.strip()
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.upper()
else:
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.ST_NAME.str.cat(df_t1.PC_NAME,sep='_')
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.replace(' ','_')
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.strip()
df_t1['Unique']=df_t1.Unique.str.upper()
#PC_names have trailing spaces! - the 'strip' removes these so we can search
between different years!

if(year2=='2009' or year2 == '2014'):
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.State_name.str.cat(df_t2.PC_name,sep='_')
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.replace(' ','_')
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.strip()
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.upper()
else:
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.ST_NAME.str.cat(df_t2.PC_NAME,sep='_')
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.replace(' ','_')
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.strip()
df_t2['Unique']=df_t2.Unique.str.upper()
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unique_vals_t1=df_t1['Unique'].unique()
unique_vals_t2=df_t2['Unique'].unique()
unique_vals = list(set(unique_vals_t1).intersection(unique_vals_t2))
unique_vals.sort()
#unique_vals now has id per constituency common to both years

df_t1_indexed=df_t1.set_index('Unique')
df_t2_indexed=df_t2.set_index('Unique')
#alternatively, try indexing with two columns? for another day.

#for now, use arrays:
a_t1=df_t1.values
a_t2=df_t2.values

out_a_t1=[]
margins=[]

#unique,margin,won_flag
margin_based_t1=[]
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nda_alliance_list_for_year1=dict1['NDA']
nda_alliance_list_for_year2=dict2['NDA']
upa_alliance_list_for_year1=dict1['UPA']
upa_alliance_list_for_year2=dict2['UPA']

count=0
for v in unique_vals:
print(v)
df_t1_constituency_slice=pd.DataFrame(df_t1_indexed.loc[v])
df_t2_constituency_slice=pd.DataFrame(df_t2_indexed.loc[v])

a_t1_constituency_slice=df_t1_constituency_slice.values
a_t2_constituency_slice=df_t2_constituency_slice.values

#Start processing per slice i.e. per constituency
total_votes=0
margin=0.0

#index to locate where in the slice the particular party we are interested in lies
#assuming dataset is sorted within constituency
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#if the party was a winner, this will be first pos i.e. value of indec will be 0; else
non-zero
partyname_position_in_slice=0

#if(
#a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \
#or a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \
#or a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist \
#or a_t2_constituency_slice[1][dict1['partyname_index']] not in partylist ):
#

continue;

#nda_alliance_list_for_year1=dict1['NDA']
#nda_alliance_list_for_year2=dict2['NDA']
#upa_alliance_list_for_year1=dict1['UPA']
#upa_alliance_list_for_year2=dict2['UPA']

#binary variable # =1 if party won in t+1
# =0 if party did not win in t+1
won_flag=0;

#hack for alliance - break when first party in alliance is found
found_flag=0
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count+=1

current_party_in_slice_year1=''
current_party_in_slice_year1_alliance=''
current_party_in_slice_year2=''
current_party_in_slice_year2_alliance=''
for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]):
total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]

current_party_in_slice_year1=a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]

if(current_party_in_slice_year1=='IND'):
continue;

if current_party_in_slice_year1 in nda_alliance_list_for_year1:
current_party_in_slice_year1_alliance='NDA'
elif(current_party_in_slice_year1 in upa_alliance_list_for_year1):
current_party_in_slice_year1_alliance='UPA'
else:
current_party_in_slice_year1_alliance=''
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#if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname):
if(current_party_in_slice_year1_alliance==partyname and found_flag==0):
partyname_position_in_slice=i;
found_flag=1;
#assumption here is that there are never multiple candidates from same party
contesting the same constituency

if found_flag==0:

print("FFFFFFFFFFFOOOOOOOOUUUUUUUUUUUUNNNNNNNNNDDDDDDDD
D FLLLLLLLLLLLAAAAAAAAAAGGGGGGGGGGG=0!!!!")
continue;

if(partyname_position_in_slice==0):
margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']]
else:

margin=a_t1_constituency_slice[partyname_position_in_slice][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]
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margin = margin*100.0/total_votes

current_party_in_slice_year2=a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]
if current_party_in_slice_year2 in nda_alliance_list_for_year2:
current_party_in_slice_year2_alliance='NDA'
elif(current_party_in_slice_year2 in upa_alliance_list_for_year2):
current_party_in_slice_year2_alliance='UPA'
else:
current_party_in_slice_year2_alliance=''

#if(a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]==partyname):
if(current_party_in_slice_year2_alliance==partyname):
won_flag=1
else:
won_flag=0

margin_based_t1.append([v,margin,won_flag])
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#here we have generated margin_based_t1 table
#cols are unique(pc_id),margin in t1 for party, flag indicating whether party won or
not in t2
#sort by margin

margin_based_t1=sorted(margin_based_t1,key=itemgetter(1))
binned_margin_t1=[]

print("Here--------------->",binned_margin_t1)

for i in range(len(margin_based_t1)):
bin_no=int(math.floor(abs((margin_based_t1[i][1]))/bin_width))
if(margin_based_t1[i][1]<0.0):
sign_flag=-1.0
else:
sign_flag=+1.0
bin_no=int(bin_no*bin_width)+bin_width/2.0
bin_no=bin_no*sign_flag
print(margin_based_t1[i][1],bin_no)
binned_margin_t1.append([bin_no,margin_based_t1[i][2]])
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half_total_bins=int(math.ceil(100/bin_width))#one-sided total
final_binned_margin=[]
for i in range(half_total_bins):
bin_no_search1=-1.0*(i*bin_width+bin_width/2.0)
bin_no_search2=+1.0*(i*bin_width+bin_width/2.0)

count_won1=0.0
count_all1=0.0
count_won2=0.0
count_all2=0.0

for j in range(len(binned_margin_t1)):

if(binned_margin_t1[j][0]==bin_no_search1):
count_all1=count_all1+1;
if(binned_margin_t1[j][1]==1):
count_won1=count_won1+1;

if(binned_margin_t1[j][0]==bin_no_search2):
count_all2=count_all2+1;
if(binned_margin_t1[j][1]==1):
count_won2=count_won2+1;
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if(count_all1!=0):

final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search1,count_won1/count_all1,count_all1,count_
won1])
else:
final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search1,0,count_all1,count_won1])

if(count_all2!=0):

final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search2,count_won2/count_all2,count_all2,count_
won2])
else:
final_binned_margin.append([bin_no_search2,0,count_all2,count_won2])

final_binned_margin=sorted(final_binned_margin,key=itemgetter(0))
final_df=pd.DataFrame(final_binned_margin)
final_df.to_csv(outputfile,index=False)
outf=open(outputfile2,'w')
for i in range(len(final_binned_margin)):
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line=str(final_binned_margin[i][0])+"\t"+str(final_binned_margin[i][1])+"\t"+str(final_bi
nned_margin[i][2])+"\t"+str(final_binned_margin[i][3])+"\n"
outf.write(line)

outf.close()

print(count)
"""
if(a_t2_constituency_slice[0][dict2['partyname_index']]==partyname):
#calculate and append BJP margin to year 't'
#assuming dataset is sorted within constituency
if(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['position_index']]==1
a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname):
bjp_margin_t1=(a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[1][dict1['votes_index']])
else:
for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]):
if(a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['partyname_index']]==partyname):
bjp_margin_t1=a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]a_t1_constituency_slice[0][dict1['votes_index']]
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and

total_votes=0
for i in range(a_t1_constituency_slice.shape[0]):
total_votes=total_votes+a_t1_constituency_slice[i][dict1['votes_index']]

bjp_margin_t1=bjp_margin_t1*100.0/total_votes

print(bjp_margin_t1)
out_a_t1.append([v,bjp_margin_t1])
margins.append(bjp_margin_t1)

binwidth=1.0
numbins=200/binwidth + 1.0
bins=np.linspace(-100,100,numbins)
hist,bin_edges = np.histogram(margins,bins)

x=bin_edges[0:numbins-1]
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x=x+0.5
y=hist

out_df_t1=pd.DataFrame({'Count':y,'Margin':x})
out_df_t1=out_df_t1[['Margin','Count']]
out_df_t1.to_csv(outputfile,index=False)
plt.scatter(x,y)
plt.grid()
plt.plot(x,y)
plt.show()

"""

#for v in unique_vals
#

print(df_2009[])

#for i in range(len(a2009)):
#
#

for j in range(len(a2009[i])):
print(a2009[i][j])

100

#for row in df_2009[:25].itertuples():
#print(row)

#for i in range(1):
#
#

for j in range(14):
print(a2009[i][j])
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